Showing posts with label marxism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label marxism. Show all posts

Friday, August 2, 2019

Marx and the Composition of the Proletariat


            One of the most common critiques that I hear of Marx within several specific academic frameworks is that Marx somehow imagines a ‘homogenous proletariat.’ Marx’s simplified vision of the world is almost inevitably contrasted with a more sophisticated vision of the world that is either being proposed by the speaker or is taken up by a thinker that the speaker wants to see either supplant Marx or transcend his limited vision. To be clear, this interpretation is not invented whole cloth by this audience. One can only turn to particular threads of Marxist iconography, particularly within the tradition of socialist realism and particular trends of ‘anti-identitarian’ Marxism to find this homogeneity either in the singular image of the heroic male worker who is intended to stand in for the proletariat as a whole or the antagonism toward difference found within certain strands of thought. However, this interpretation of Marx doesn’t particular hold up well when you turn to the first volume of Capital. I’m going to turn to that work to first try to understand how that interpretation arises from that work, and then look at how that interpretation falls apart when we consider the work as a whole. Rather than producing homogeneity, Marx argues the infinite chain of equivalence at the heart of capitalist accumulation is dependent on an intense process of discipline that not only constructs forms of difference but is deeply committed individualization of the worker and the citizen.

            The homogeneity reading probably can be best understood by looking at the first chapter of Capital. Marx begins his investigation into political economy by examining the “” the commodity. This chapter attempts to answer the question, what is behind the endless chain of equivalences that form market relations. Why can we think about objects as different and discrete as linen, coffee, and gold in relation to each other? To do so, Marx distinguishes between use and exchange value. The use of an object is singular and cannot determine the forms of equivalence that drive the commodity form. The fact that I can use the bible that Marx discusses as a form of edification, an object for display to establish an identify for an audience, or as a doorstop doesn’t really explain its cost. Use value is central to that system. If an item doesn’t have a use, it won’t be purchased, and therefore will by necessity fall out of the circulatory process of the system. However, to understand why something is worth something, we have to look at its exchange value, the point that Marx spends most of the chapter on. Marx then diligently works through dozens of permutations of equations in order to get to the notion that value at the heart of this system is what he calls ‘socially necessary labor.’ The value is dependent on average time it takes to produce something within a given social setting. Marx emphasizes that this is by no means a stable system and his work in Capital and The Poverty of Philosophy goes into the ways that forms of competition, class struggle, and technological development cause this to change. He then goes on to explore how the exploitation of this labor is necessary for the production of surplus value.

            However, one can see where one could get to a notion of homogeneity through a good faith reading of this section of the book. In order for labor to act as an equivalent, there has to be some sense of the sameness of that labor. But Marx has already provided some pretty important caveats that should warn against this reading. He has already indicated he is thinking of labor only within the context of simple average labor, which by its nature, excludes more complex and skilled forms of labor. Even more significantly, he argues,

If we then disregard the use-value of commodities, only one property remains, that of being products of being products of labour. But even the product of labor has already been transformed in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use-value, we abstract also from the material constituents and forms which make it a use-value. It is no longer a table, a house, a piece of yarn or any other useful thing. All its sensuous characteristics are extinguished. Nor is it any longer the product of the joiner, the mason, or the spinner, or any other particular kind of productive labour. With the disappearance of the  useful character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.
            Let us now look at the residue of the products of labour. There is nothing left of them in each case but the same phantom-like objectivity; they are merely congealed quantities of homogenous human labour, i.e. of human labour-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure. All these things now tell us is that human labour-power has been expended to produce them, human labour is accumulated in them. As crystals of this social substance, which is common to them all, they are values—commodity values” (Marx 128).

 The homogeneity of labor power is only possible through an intense process of abstraction. It operates in the averages of multiple competing spaces of production, rather than within the material practices of the laboring process. It disciplines and animates the process of production and as we will see later has a deep impact how we conceive ourselves in relationship to each other, but it gives no sense of how something is produced. Moreover, there is a critical edge to the description of this process, indicating a sense of violence that is implicit in this process and its erasure of particularity, one that isn’t simply limited to a sense that roughly equivalent workers are being roughly equivalently exploited. But the full implications of that critique are only available later in the book. After all, we’re still operating within the terrain of the market, the realm of equivalences that is dependent on equals interacting and competing as sellers and buyers.

To understand the laboring process that creates the condition for that market to work, we need to begin by turning to Ch 13, Co-operation. Marx opens the chapter by emphasizing the importance of social production. Marx notes, “Capitalist production only really begins, as we have previously seen, when each individual capital simultaneously employs a comparatively large number of workers, and when, as a result, the labour-process is carried on on an extensive scale, and yields relatively large quantities of products.” (Marx 439) The increase in the level of workers tends to average out the differences in production within this condition even without the intervention of machinery, but the introduction of machinery intensifies this process, shifting the relationship of workers to their work. Marx notes, “When  numerous workers work together side by side in accordance with a plan, whether in the same process, or in different but connected processes, this form of labor is called cooperation” (Marx 443) That cooperation create the conditions in which the labor of many creates a level of productivity that could not be matched by the same amount of workers in isolation. The process of cooperation itself intensifies production and the level of exploitation.

Marx intensifies his analysis when he turns to the next chapter, “The Division of Labor and Manufacture”. He argues that the process of cooperation within the factory setting specifically produces a kind of collective worker that is produced through the cooperative process of the factory. He notes,

The collective worker, formed out of the combination of a number of specialized workers, is the item of machinery specifically characteristic of the manufacturing period. The various operations performed in turn by the producer of a commodity, which coalesce during the labour process, make demands of various kinds on him. In one operation he must exert more strength, in another more skill, in another more attention; and the same individual does not possess these skills in an equal degree. After the  various operations have been separated, made independent and isolated, the workers are divided, classified and grouped according to their predominant qualities. If their natural endowments are the foundation on which the division of labour is built up, manufacture, once introduced, develops in them new powers that are by nature only fitted for limited special functions. The collective worker now possesses all the qualities necessary for production in an equal degree of excellence, and expends them in the most economical way by exclusively employing all his organs, individualized in particular workers or groups of workers, in performing their special functions. The one-sidedness and even the deficiencies of the specialized worker become perfections when he is part of the collective worker. The habit of doing only one thing converts him into an organ which operates with the certainty of a force of nature, while his connection with the whole mechanism compels him to work with the regularity of a machine.
Since the various functions performed by the collective worker can be simple or complex, high or low, the individual labour-powers, his organs, require different degrees of training, and must therefore possess very different values. Manufacture therefore develops a hierarchy of labour-powers, to which there corresponds a scale of wages. The individual workers are appropriated and annexed for life by a limited function; while the various operations of the hierarchy of labour powers are parceled out among the workers according to both their natural and their acquired capacities. Every process of production, however, requires certain manipulations, which every man is capable of doing. These actions too are now separated from their constant interplay with those aspects of activity which are richer in content, and ossified into the exclusive functions of particular individuals. (Marx 469)

            As we can see in this extensive passage. The figure that constitutes the figure of equivalence is a sort of collective assemblage of workers and machinery, disciplined into a matrix of procedures by a plan or set of plans. The overall effect of this process is a disciplinary homogeneity, produced by each individual worker’s connection to ‘the whole mechanism’ in order to produce ‘an equal degree of excellence.’ However, the process that produces this almost cyborgic subjectivity does not transform the individual parts into equivalents. Instead, the parts of the machine are defined by specialization and individualization. This process may start with some sense of ‘natural endowments’ but the disciplinary apparatus quickly steps into ‘develop in them new powers that are by nature only fitted for special limited functions.’ Rather than creating homogeneity, capitalist discipline within Marx’s analysis produces an intense form of individualization that is enforced by Marx’s use of the metaphor of the specialized organ of the body. This specialization also involves hierarchy, a division between ‘simple or complex, high or low’ forms of labor, corresponding to a ‘scale of wages.’ At this point, it’s hard to recognize the image of Marx that we discussed at the beginning of the essay.

            However, Marx’s examination of the disciplinary process doesn’t stop at the point of production, the factory. Instead, he shifts into a discussion of the monitoring of populations that are selectively brought into and are taken out of the productive process depending on the economic cycle, the ‘Industrial Reserve Army of the Unemployed.’ This shift notably moves the classificatory and disciplinary system as noted previously to the outside of the factory, and it shifts the narrative from the relationship between employer and employee to a state logic. The increase of the use of machines creates a surplus population that no longer is needed in the factories. These populations are then brought into the factories and are ejected from them in response to the boom and bust cycle that defines the process of capitalist accumulation. Marx notes that these surplus populations are not as Malthus has it, a product of natural processes, but a distinct historical product of capitalist accumulation.

            For our purpose though, the importance of this category is its continuation of the process of distinction and individuation that begins in the factory itself. We see the state introducing an intense set of disciplinary apparatuses to classify and divide the population for purposes of surveillance and policing. The proletariat then is not only defined by an intense formation of individuation and differentiation at the level of the factory, but outside as well. We find a class formation that is deeply fragmented through the disciplinary process of capitalist accumulation, differentiated by skill, access to work, legal status, and other factors. It’s easy to see how this analysis can incorporate the modes of racialization that both define the history of the workplace along with the forms policing that contribute to the construction of a racialized population. It’s notable that Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s analysis of the prison in Gold Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California operates through the categories of surplus populations and the industrial army of the unemployed introduced by the first volume of Capital.

            At a historical level, Marx doesn’t minimize the importance of imperialism and slavery in constructing the capitalist world system. As Marx notes in Chapter 31: The Genesis of Industrial Capitalism,

“The discovery gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in minds of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings if the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation Hard on their heels follows the commercial war of the European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes gigantic dimensions in England’s Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the shape of the Opium Wars against China, etc…. Force is the midwife of every society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power. (Marx 915-916

            Far from ignoring the forces of colonialism, Marx identifies the colonial process as both the starting point of capitalist accumulation, and as an ongoing process as the reference to the Opium Wars indicates. The European system of industrialization is dialectically intertangled with the process of colonialism and each is dependent on the other. We can see Marx distinctively identifying the operation of capitalism as a world system, one that is dependent on extraordinary levels of violence and force to keep in motion. We might also see this as another moment of heterogeneity in Marx’s analysis. If the factory is marked by individualization and disciplining of the workforce, and the construction of surplus populations requires state discipline and surveillance, the factory itself requires colonial violence to make its production viable. Marx earlier in the book makes the same observation about the relationship between factory production, notably textiles and the plantation, the two systems mutually reinforcing each other’s growth.

            Just as significantly, he sees the transformations after the civil war as central to understanding the possible transformation of the system. Marx introduces this in the Preface to the First Edition to the book. “Let us not deceive ourselves about this. Just as in the eighteenth century the American War of Independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle class, so in the nineteenth century the American Civil War did the same for the European working class.” (Marx 91) Far from playing an incidental role in the transformation in the world system, Marx saw the civil war as a marker for a dramatic shift in social conflict. He continues this analysis at the end of the preface, “At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Mr. Wade, Vice-President of the United States, has declared in public meetings that, after the abolition of slavery, a radical transformation in the existing relations of capital and landed property is on the agenda. These are signs of the times,  not to be hidden by purple mantles or black Cossacks. They do not signify that tomorrow a miracle will occur. They do show that, within the ruling classes themselves, the foreboding is emerging that the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and constantly engaged in a process of change.” (Marx 93) Slavery in effect played a lynchpin role in holding together the system and its abolition created possibilities for transformation, albeit far from certain ones.

            None of this erases the flawed political analysis and practice of Marxist groups throughout the long history of their operation, and nor should it, but it points to a rich set of possibilities that are contained within Marx’s analysis and create the space to continue to use and build on Marx’s materialist analysis. I’m not sure what I’m going to do with this at this point, but I wanted work through some of this material.

Thursday, March 30, 2017

A Response to the Critiques of Intersectionality

The past few years have been defined by a debate over the value of what can roughly be called intersectionality.  There has been a sustained critical attack on the framework by a loosely associated group of self-described Marxist thinkers, many of whom have coalesced around a radical journal, Jacobin.[1]  Despite some real differences in its participants, this group can be defined by two qualities: the interest in returning to a party form, whether in the form of a reformist, social democratic organization or in the form of a more radical, Marxist formation, and the tendency to want to center those organization on a more class focused analysis.[2]  It’s important to note that this group isn’t the first group to critique the framework, and critiques of intersectionality have come from a variety of perspectives, ranging from feminist critiques of the framework to Afro-Pessimist and social reproduction theory.  These critiques point to the real contentions over the now dominant theoretical framework and its perceived limitations.  More significantly, there are points that these frameworks make that potentially show the limitations of the intersectionality framework
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 However, Jacobin oriented critique has defined the present debates, rather than the more limited and nuanced critiques presented by social reproduction theory and the rather blunter rejection of the theory by Afro-Pessimism.  The problem with this mode of critique is that it rejects the close materialist analysis of the theory ostensibly embraced by the group making the critique.  Rather than taking a close look at how the framework was created, how it evolved, and how it became a dominant theoretical framework for a variety of academic and activist groups and institutions, the perspective has the tendency to reduce the theory to its primary metaphor, the intersection, and places that in opposition to the superior Marxist framework.  In effect, rather than taking on the kind of immanent critique embraced by Marx in his work, this work jettisons Marx’s methodology, while holding onto his image as one worthy of veneration.   It’s notable that these critiques have generally occurred within the interstices of academic and political discourse, in twitter battles and Facebook comments, effectively avoiding the need for substantial engagement through the limitations of the media. In intend to begin this discussion by closely reading one such intervention, and then to contrast that engagement with a sketch of what such a materialist engagement would need to take on to live up to that framework.

We can see this framework spelled out by a Facebook posting that was widely distributed by this grouping, a statement made by R.L. Stephens, who states:

"The sooner we accept that intersectionality is a bad theory, the better off we'll be. As a moral principle or ethos, it's alright. But it cannot properly explain the world as it exists nor as it should one day be. 

Taking race for example, intersectionality posits that race and class intersect, which implies that they are distinct. That's ahistorical. Race only exists because of class, and because of a particular moment of class conflict at that. Intersectionality (by virtue of its roots in Title VII anti-discrimination law) is based on the premise that race is immutable, meaning unchanging and constant. Yet, we make and remake race every day because race is an ideology wholly dependent on class, not an abstract transhistorical "immutable characteristic" as the law says.

If we abandon the idea of essentialism, of fixed immutable identities, then we've rejected a critical underlying premise upon which the *theory* of intersectionality is built. I am not criticizing people's moral or ethical desire to be inclusive and fight against discrimination. I share that principle and I've dedicated my life to pursuing it. Intersectionality as a theory is not a proper worldview, and it cannot help us get to the world we want to see."

The statement is attempting to do a lot of theoretical work within a very short space, so it’s going to take a while to break down that material.  The statement wisely begins by separating the notion of intersectionality as a theoretical framework from the broad ethical commitments that are implied by that framework.  In effect, the comment wants to avoid impinging on the commitment to opposing racism and sexism within the framework, while challenging its ability to understand the causes of such phenomenon.  No problem so far, but as the analysis shifts into the second paragraph, and moves into the actual critique, it starts to go off tracks.  It begins implying that intersectionality posits the notion that class and race exist independently of one another, but the very notion of intersection rejects this independence.  The passage is, in effect, making a very elementary mistake, confusing categories of analysis with the reality that those categories of analysis are designed to help us understand.  The more significant impact of the framework is that no one category of analysis is going to be sufficient to understanding that reality. Stephens may reject this framework, and want to place a primacy on class and class struggle to understand this complex phenomenon, but the argument that this framework sets up race and class as distinct phenomenon doesn’t really hold up.

Moving on, Stephen argues that the framework of intersectionality has its beginnings in the construction of title VII anti-discrimination law and that both have the same theoretical shortcomings, notably that both operate on the premise that “race is immutable, meaning unchanging and constant.” While it’s true that a few notable creators of the intersectionality framework, notably Kimberle Crenshaw have a background in legal studies and probably had an impact on the framing of the law, it doesn’t necessarily hold that those thinkers hold by the framework of the law that they might have influenced or even helped write.[3]  But by doing so, Stephens argues that the legalistic framework of title VII with the theoretical framework of intersectionality are equivalent, a critique of one can stand in for a critique of the other.  Because the law frames race as ‘immutable’, the thinkers of intersectionality must accept the same premises.  Stephens then points out how foolish that assumption is because “we make and remake race every day….”[4] The rest of the analysis is an outgrowth of this critique.

This critique would be fairly damning if it were true.  The meaning of race is continually mutating and is defined by a series of ongoing and uneven struggles over its meaning, and efforts to fix its meaning are primarily linked to efforts to shore up racist institutions and practices.  But the argument is premised on the notion that the framework of intersectionality is homologous to the law.  I don’t think this works.  To understand why not, we need to turn to the origins of the intersectional framework.  The narrative that follows offers a very rough sketch of this process, and one that has been better explained by quite a few people, but it will do for the present.  That work exists in a very specific feminist context.  From the late 1960’s to the mid 1970’s, feminist theoretical work was defined by a variety of efforts to understand how women operated as a class.  This work drew from the ideas of Marx and Freud, but more significantly, was influenced by structuralism, which attempted to identify ahistorical structures that defined the daily lives of individuals, often at the unconscious level.  It rejected the phenomenological emphasis on experience to argue that experience itself had to be understood as being structured by a series of rules sets that defined social life.  Radical feminism drew on this work, and attempted to understand the experiences of women through the framework of patriarchy, which set and enforced a series of untenable rules upon the lives of women.  The work of Kate Millet, Shulamith Firestone, Juliet Michell, and Gayle Rubin[5] in their own individual ways, attempted to show how patriarchy shaped and defined the lives of women. The cultural feminism of the early to mid-1970’s only intensified the trans-historical tendencies of radical feminism.

The concept of intersectionality arose out of a variety of black feminist critiques of this feminist tradition, beginning with the work of the Combahee River Collective.  The work argued that the experiences of black women were left out of the efforts to frame women as a class, which based its structural analysis based on the experiences of white women.  That work emphasized that its existence was based on a series of common struggles in response to the intertwined forms of oppression and exploitation that defined the experience of black women.  Far from claiming that these forms of oppression were timeless and trans-historical, the collective framed the existence of its politics in relationship to the transformation of the society in the post-WWII era.  The framework found in the initial statement of the collective can be found in almost all the work that started the framework of intersectionality.  Far from attempting to claim that the category of race was trans-historical, the framework used experiences of racism to challenge the structuralist assumptions of radical feminism. When we start to look at Crenshaw’s work on the subject, we see a legal theorist looking at a series of projects that operate under either the premise of the radical feminist ‘women as a class’ or the legal categories of oppression created by civil rights legislation.  What she finds is that these frameworks of analysis produce reform projects that cannot or will not deal with the needs of the women who are supposed to be aided by these actions, whether in the form of legal decisions or the form of spaces designed to allow women to escape from domestic assault.  Far from emphasizing the trans-historical nature of race, Crenshaw’s analysis emphasized the particularity of the experience of oppression, one that needs multiple vectors of analysis to understand.

This is further complicated by the both implicit and explicit critiques of the concept of race as developed by black nationalist figures of the period by black feminists, challenging their emphasis on the primacy of race as a category of analysis and perhaps more significantly, the essentialist understanding of race within these analyses.  These critiques can be seen in the work of bell hooks, Michelle Wallace, and Audre Lorde, and largely destroy any remaining shred of the legitimacy of Stephens’ critique.[6] Intersectionality, rather than a framework of timeless essentialist identities, argues for an analysis of concrete struggles that engages in multiple frameworks of analysis.  It attempts to complicate previous frameworks of analysis, and uses that complication to engage in an analysis of historical struggle.  There is space to critique this framework for analyzing and engaging in those struggles, but those critiques must actually take on the history of this form of critique.  It’s also worth noting that intersectionality theory has taken on a multiplicity of meanings and forms over the past thirty years, and newer forms might have begun to engage in the essentialism that Stephens discussed, but a critique of those transformations needs to engage in those specific analyses, rather than claim their problematic claims as standing in for a whole of intersectionality that often stands against those claims.  Similarly, one cannot ignore the radical roots of this theory if certain contemporary strands seem to support or reproduce the logic of the contemporary neoliberalism.  Critique needs to be immanent and materialist, which has largely been ignored by current debate.


[1] I’m specifically referring to intellectual and political networks here, rather than the editorial policies of the publication.
[2] I should note that the first position is held more strongly than the second position, where there is more diversity in the group.
[3] As far as I know, there is no indication that any significant thinker within the framework helped create these laws.
[4] Stephens frames this slightly differently than is framed here, arguing that the shifting meaning of the definition of race occurs because of its dependence on class, but even if one accepts such a premise, class itself goes through similar transformations. The more significant critique is the notion that intersectionality ignores the very real transformations of the meaning of race, which is why I focus on that critique, rather than the larger framework.
[5] To name a few significant thinkers in this framework.
[6] One can also see this in the work of Marlon Riggs.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

A long selection on cultural studies


           In order to deal with this set of questions, it’s necessary to look at the formation of cultural studies historically, or to put it in other words, why does a formation called ‘cultural studies’ come into existence at the time it does?  To begin, it’s worth delimiting this field; we are primarily discussing the center of the capitalist world system, primarily Europe and the United States, although the effects of decolonization cannot be ignored on these locations.  This means sketching out some of the challenges that the transformations of the capitalist world system pose for radical social movements after the second war.  It then means looking at the critical engagement that is posed by the group of thinkers that are organized under the category of ‘cultural studies’, and the set of tools that they develop in order to understand the new forms of social institutions and relations that exist under Fordist and Post-Fordist modes of production, relations that are not easily reduced to the economic, but rather permeate all aspects of daily life.  At that point, it’s possible to engage with the question of the questions posed by the prompt, although not necessarily within the same terms posed by them.

           The end of World War II was marked by several shifts in the capitalist world system.  Perhaps the most obvious of these transformations is the shift from a world system that was dominated by the British Empire to one that was dominated by the United States.  This shift also marks a distinctly different relationship between the center and the periphery, from a relationship of direct colonialism to a more diffuse set of indirect and diffuse relations of domination defined by the developmental state and later, neo-liberalism.  At the same time, the process of decolonization is also defined by resistances to these new forms of domination.[1]

            Shifting to the social structures of the core countries, there is a shift in the economic conditions of the working classes, as well as its political position in these countries.  This shift is defined by the consolidation of the Keynesian economics in the post war society, integrating the working classes through increased wages, a social safety net, and union representation, at the cost of some of the more radical aspects of the political movements of the time.  This economic model was reproduced throughout Europe through the economic aid given in the Marshall Plan.  This shift simultaneously brought a left a level of comfort to workers that was never previously available, but simultaneously compromised the formerly autonomous structures produced by the worker’s movement, producing a serious crisis in both Marxist political practice and theory.[2]

            Simultaneously, this project, most frequently identified with Fordism, also produced a remarkable transformation in working class households, although unevenly, and in a manner that reproduced the structural racism of the period.  This transformation was marked by a shift of working class families from the city to the suburbs, and into single family dwellings.  Those families were placed in a position to live comfortably for the most part on one salary, and the living conditions of unionized workers and their middle-class managers were at times, indistinguishable.  This also created a large body of working class women who stayed at home to raise children and focus on the responsibilities of reproductive labor, although in isolation.[3]

            The construction of this household could be the most important technology to bring the working class family into a regime of sexuality.  According to Foucault, this regime initially starts with the self conceptualization of the bourgeoisie as a class, and, “by and for the privileged classes, spread through the entire social body.”[4] The urban proletariat enters into this regime at a very particular moment, first with them implementation of set of census practices of the 18th and 19th centuries, and then at a more intensive level, with the beginning of “the epoch of Spatkapitalismus in which the exploitation does not demand the same violent and physical constraints as in the nineteenth century, and where the politics of the body does not require the elision of sex….”[5]

         Although, Foucault never makes the connection himself, there is a distinct connection between the construction of a gendered division of reproductive labor in the household and the intensification of a regime of sexuality of the working classes.  It would be too complex to deal with adequately, this construction of the household comes at a moment where the construction of this social class becomes an additional wage to the working classes, a wage that takes the form of the use of women’s labor as a social commons for the benefit of men across class lines, a social contract that is noted in the work of Gayle Rubin amongst others, although theorized in a trans-historical manner.[6] The collective labor then became marked as the grounds that would guarantee the reproduction of the society, a class configuration radically naturalized and depoliticized.[7]

            With this in mind, one can understand the activities of a number of small, radical political groups, such as the Forrest-Johnson tendency[8] in the United States, the Socialism or Barbarism group[9] in France, and the Potere Operia group[10] in Italy, which can be defined by the attempt to understand the recomposition of the working classes in response to the immense social transformation of the capitalist world system after the war.  Each of these group’s investigations were both extremely provincial, in the sense that they put a great deal of emphasis on linking Marxism with a strong, concrete sociological interest in investigating the lived experiences of contemporary factory workers, at the same time these groups saw their projects take a global dimension in their emphasis on the linkages the groups made with each other, along with their exchanges of ideas.  These projects, along with a number of feminist projects, become the first steps on the long march to a new revolutionary project, one that draws from them but takes form in a way that they could not predict.

            To turn to the more formally academic sphere, this radical shift in the social relations of the system are most immediately taken up by three thinkers, within different social context and with different critical tools, Richard Hoggart borrowing from and transforming a literary and cultural analysis borrowed from F.R. Leavis within an English context, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s engagement with a German critical tradition from the perspective of exile, and Henri Lefebvre’s attempt to construct a Marxist sociology in France in the immediate aftermath of the liberation of that country.  Despite their considerable differences, all are beginning to try to use the resources they have available to them to start to produce conceptual tools to produce a critique of dominant social relations, emphasizing its forms of alienation and exploitation.  None paint a particularly positive portrait of their present days, although Lefebvre’s analysis is less phobic then the ones offered by Hoggart and Horkheimer and Adorno.

            The earliest of the engagements is by Adorno and Horkheimer through their engagement with the concept of enlightenment in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, particularly through their engagement with the culture industry.  This industry is seen to replace older forms of the myth of the society, one that introduces a new and more pernicious form of deception.  As the two note, “The whole world is made to pass through the filter of the culture industry.”[11]  The role of this industry as a social mediator operates a sort of analogy to exchange value in the everyday life relations.  Just as the structure of exchange value allowed for the masking of the domination that occurred at the workplace, creating an abstract machine of equivalence that could create surplus value, the cultural industry as a whole has molded men as a type unfailingly reproduced in every product.  All the agents of this process, from the producer to the women’s clubs, take good care that the simple reproduction of this mental state is not nuanced or extended in any way.”[12]  The culture industry then becomes the face of nature of social domination and alienation that marks the entire history of the Enlightenment, through its engagement with instrumental reason.  It marks the intensification of this social domination along with its impoverishment.  At the same time, this system is also marked by the inability to imagine a positive alternative to it, leaving the negativity of the dialectic as the only way to engage with the system.

           Lefebvre’s engagement is the second one to occur historically, the first of the texts being produced just after the liberation of France in 1947.  His text poses the need for a new approach to the critique of everyday life that he sees previously fulfilled by a French literary avant-garde, moving from Baudelaire and Rimbaud to the Surrealists.  He argues that this critique operated from the outside of everyday life, and was limited by its refusal to engage in an immanent critique of the phenomenon.  Instead, Lefebvre proposed a new sociological approach to the question, which would offer an immanent approach to the problems of everyday life, an approach that would focus on the concept of alienation, and the ways that alienation both had to take on its own terms as a form of reality, and at the same time, had to recognized for its modes of deception.

            Similar to the approach offered by Horkheimer and Adorno, Lefebvre argued that this was only possible through an engagement with the dialectic, although in a far more conventional manner.  For Lefebvre, this meant producing an engagement with the concept aufgehoben, which he notes is not easily translated into French.  The critique of everyday life needs to be able to both ‘abolish something (as it was) and to raise it to a higher level.[13]  This double movement, which contains an element of conservation through its fulfillment of the alienate possibilities of the earlier social formation, while abolishing it for a new social formation, presumably defined by less social alienation.  This is tied to a process of trying to find the ‘total man’, the unalienated man.  It’s not sure whether this could actually come into existence within Lefebvre’s analysis, but it is a necessary concept to allow for the critique of everyday life to be linked to radical political project.

           Hoggart’s analysis is the last of the three initial engagements with the questions of culture and the everyday, and, in many ways, is the strangest of the grouping.  Written in 1957, it draws from a traditional approach to literary criticism, however it also includes elements of ethnography and autobiography in its analysis.  This strange and eclectic mixture of genres and disciplines tries to map a shift in the culture of working class England by first establishing an earlier formation of this culture, and then map out the shifts that are currently occurring in that culture.  He does this by defining the social milieu of everyday life, the household, the neighborhood, religion and popular texts.  Within that, he shifts between an analysis of culture as a lived experience, and culture as a system of signs.  His analysis is not an optimistic one as can be seen early in the text.

            This cultural pessimism links up Hoggart’s analysis to a conservative anti-capitalist tradition[14] that runs from the 18th century to the middle part of the 20th century, although in a slightly more cautious form then found in those writers.  Hoggart refuses the concept of the golden age that defines that tradition, [15]however he still emphasizes the loss that occurs from the shift to the city from the countryside.  This new development only completes the process that had already started some time ago.  For Hoggart, the most valuable resources of working class culture are those which are preserved from the agrarian traditions that were brought into the city. The earlier formation of the working class can engage with the novelties of capitalism in a manner that is selective.  It could take in those innovations that were useful to it; however these innovations are now deluging this culture and can no longer be engaged with in the same manner.

“My argument is not that there was, in England one generation ago, an urban culture still very much ‘of the people’ and that now there is only a mass urban culture.  It is rather that the appeals made by the mass publicists are for a great number of reasons made more insistently, effectively and in a more comprehensive and centralized form today than they were earlier; that we are moving towards the creation of a mass culture; that the remnants of what was at least in parts an urban culture ‘of the people’ are being destroyed; and that the new mass culture is in some important ways less healthy than the often crude culture it is replacing.”[16]

            The effect of this deluge is marked by a profound loss.  Although the old forms of society are not defined by the authenticity that so many generations of conservatives found in their childhood, they are still marked by a health that is missing from the new order that is coming in to being.  The cheap flood of commodities that dominate this new set of social relations have some immediate benefits, as that they are cheap, readily available and often durable.  But beyond this shallow benefit, it produced a coarsening of the social relations, as well as the destruction of a long lasting social symbolic.  Within this analysis, he focuses on many of the aspects of youth culture that would later be taken up in later formations of cultural studies, although the reading those formations is marked by conservative pessimism that do not mark later cultural studies engagements.

            Before we move on to the shift in the critical approach in methodology that occurs as cultural studies occurs as a practice, we should take some time to note some important dimensions that will mark most of the texts discussed under the rubric of cultural studies.  First, all of the texts were produced in response to a perceived crisis on the part of the authors.  These crises were not crises of the social order, but rather of the ability to understand and represent the experiences of the current form of capitalism. Second, in order to deal with that change in social relations, the authors take what might be called a multi-disciplinary approach.  The epistemological crisis puts the writer in a position where his or her original discipline is no longer sufficient to produce concepts or methods to deal with the new formation of the society that they are dealing with.  Within this crisis, the writers much seek out a new method, new concepts in order to deal with the transformation of social relations.

           In addition, all accounts link the transformation of capitalism is marked by the intensification of the role of the commodity in mediating all social relations.  The readings of this intensification differ   between the authors.  For Horkheimer, Adorno, and Hoggart this intensification is read phobically, linking to the loss of the ability to create authentic social relations.  This loss is far more radical within the work of Adorno, who unlike Hoggart, even rejects the possibility of the nostalgia that can be found throughout The Uses of Literacy. This places contemporary late capitalism within what Adorno calls ‘damaged life.’  Whereas, the engagement of this question by Lefebvre, still claims the ability to distinguish between “everyday life as it is—as it has been made by the bourgeoisie—and the life which a human being actually demands, begs for….”[17] Marking the ability to map out what might be called an authentic life, a life outside of the logic of capital, or at least not dominated by its structures.

           We can also see an attempt on the part of some of these thinkers to critically reread the tradition of historical materialism, particularly though their critical engagement with the Marxist concept of base and superstructure.  As we have already noted, this engagement already marks the work of Lefebvre and Adorno, through their separate engagement with a particular European theoretical tradition, as well as a set of critical approaches to Marxism.  For Adorno, this draws from the recognition that the commodity form’s ability to reshape all forms of social life, and for Lefebvre, it comes through the reading of Capital as a critical form of sociology, as well as an analysis of economics. This critical engagement with these questions become a focus for Raymond Williams, someone who provides an interesting transition from the conservative approach of Richard Hoggart to the engagement made by the Birmingham Center for Cultural Studies.

            Williams returns to the question of the base and superstructure throughout his career, first appearing in his 1958 book Culture and Society: 1780-1950 and then returning in Marxism and Literature, along with several other separate essays.  This analysis emphasizes a number of important elements.  The first analysis in Culture and Society begins by noting that Marx’s analysis of culture takes an incomplete form.  He notes that Marx’s occasional comments on literature, while thoughtful, don’t necessarily link up to any particular literary theory.[18] His analysis of further efforts on the part of Marxists to produce a complete theory of culture from a Marxist perspective sees these efforts primarily as failures.  He links this up with the continual linkage of culture to the superstructure.  This limits the analysis of culture to something primarily acts as an effect or acts as a mode of representation of other structures.  It doesn’t allow for a theory of culture that fully maps out a theory of culture.  This will only be found later on in his career with his reading of Gramsci, and the development of his concept of a structure of feeling in relationship to Gramsci’s concept of culture.[19]
    
        This engagement brings us away from Williams himself, and to a collective project that Williams is indirectly, the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies.  The Birmingham School then becomes a place in which a group of critical approaches and methods are congealed into a practice called cultural studies.  It is a shift that begins with Stuart Hall’s replacement of Richard Hoggart as the head of the school, along with the rise of the politics of the new left.  This shift moves from the study of the experience of everyday life to the sign systems that construct its ideological framework.  It also a shift from the pessimism and cultural conservativism that often marked the earlier models, looking instead for the possibilities for radical change that could be found in these various formations of everyday life and popular cultural formations, keeping the same emphasis on a multi-disciplinary approach to its object.  This engagement is marked by a search for critical tools and approaches to reading the ideological formations of everyday life, drawing from the interwar concepts developed by Voloshinov, Bakhtin, and Gramsci.  It also drew from contemporary French theorists Barthes, Althusser, and Foucault.  When one looks at the collected papers of the school, they are marked by this exploration of method, often acting primarily as explanations of various methods, and as translations of those methods into the set of questions that the school was posing, turning into the school papers into a method of reading.[20]

            The most significant of those engagements was the engagement with Antonio Gramsci’s work, which had only become available in the 1960’s through the compilation of his prison notebooks, which were translated in 1971.  The most important concept that is drawn from his work is the concept of hegemony.  This concept, which was already circulating within the discourse of the Third Communist International[21], became a central concept and concern for Gramsci in trying to understand the rise of fascism in his country.  The concept of hegemony emphasizes that a ruling class must depend on the consent of the governed as well as the use of force.  This consent must be created by this class through its presentation of its concerns as universal concerns, that is to say by articulating a particular social formation.  This emphasis on articulation emphasizes both the possible fragility of the ruling coalition as well as the means to create another social order, the coagulation of the subaltern classes into a new hegemony, a new state.

            At the same time, the modern, hegemonic state ends the possibility of conceiving of the subaltern classes as existing outside the relations of consent, as unaffected by the legitimating intellectual discourses of the state.  Their modes of antagonisms are incorporated into the state, through a variety of social organizations.  As Gramsci notes, “The modern state abolishes many autonomies of the subaltern classes—it abolishes the state as a federation of classes—but certain forms of the internal life of the subaltern classes are reborn as parties, trade unions, cultural associations.”[22] Within the modern liberal state, these organizations allow for the continuation of a subaltern class life can occur through their rebirth as these social organizations.  This rebirth then links up to a different mode of class struggle, a struggle defined by the war of position, rather than the war of maneuver.

           While conceptualizing the possibilities of this new war of position, Gramsci spends a considerable amount of time analyzing how the capitalist system produces consent through what would later be called para-literature, that is, through pamphlets, magazines, missionary stories, etc.  He focuses on this material, in part, because it is the only material that is available in the prison library, but Gramsci also argues that this material, material that is consumed, rather than critically engaged with, can be particularly influential.  Engaging with it can allow for an exploration of the ideological structures that legitimate the social order of his time.  He examines how this literature through cliché, through the pleasure of the narrative, through constructing and meeting social expectations, that is to say, how it produces structures of consent through forms of common sense, that is, “a conception of the world mechanically imposed by the external environment.”[23]

           For the conversations at Birmingham, this approach became a more fluid and dynamic conceptualization of ideological formations, responding to the limitations that they saw in the analysis of ideology provided by Louis Althusser.  On one hand, Althusser allows for a conceptualization of totality that recognizes the complex structure of totality, identified by Althusser as overdetermined, rather than expressive.  It recognizes the need for an analysis of society as a complex set of articulations, rather than as reducible to any form of economic determinism.  However, Hall finds limitations in Althusser’s emphasis on the concept of structural determination in his work in Reading Capital.[24]  By emphasizing the totality of the social formation, this concept loses the ability to deal with the always incomplete nature of a social formation, a reality that is more fully recognized by Gramsci’s concept of Hegemony.

            This concept of hegemony was supplemented by the concept of language provided by the Bakhtin circle, notably in Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.  The work can be seen as a double critique, both of the structuralist model that finds its initial formation in the lectures of Saussure, and at the same time, a critique of a reductionist Marxist model that would dismiss language as a mere form of reflection and representation.  This second dimension links its project up with the critiques of the base and superstructure model that Gramsci engages in.  This critique is accomplished by emphasizing language and sign production as another form of material practice, one that is central to the social structures of a society.  The sign becomes the space for social contestation, and relations of power.  As Voloshinov notes,

            “Existence reflected in sign is not merely reflected, but refracted.  How is this refraction of existence in the ideological sign determined?  By an intersecting of differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community, i.e., by the class struggle.
            Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communication.  Thus various different classes will use one and the same language.  As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign.  Sign becomes an arena of the class struggle.”[25]

            The sign then becomes the critical terrain of the class struggle.  Its engagement in that struggle is defined by the contestation of meaning that occurs through its various refractions.  This emphasis on refraction points to the creative dimension of language, its ability to not only reflect social reality, but also to engage in that reality and pose alternative forms of sociality, alternative futures.  The possibilities contained in this concept then link up with the possibilities contained in the incomplete and contestatory nature of hegemony.  The possibility of social transformation occurs within the system of language, within a set of social structures, and not outside of it.  One is both a part of a sign community and involved in struggle at the same time.

           This interest in the sign in forms of social struggle has obvious linkages with the modes of semiotic engagement that can be found at the time, particularly the work of Roland Barthes and the Tel Quel School of analysis.  For the practice of cultural studies, the earlier work of Barthes, particularly around Mythologies became the most important work, primarily because of its focus on the banal discourses of everyday life, particular those around magazines, advertisements and popular kitsch.  The arguments point to the utopian qualities of these texts, while at the same time, marking the ways that this utopian possibility is caught up in a structure of myth, a deformed structure of signification, which places its own history and contingency under erasure.  It links their construction to the continued production of a naturalized and timeless capitalism, and at the same time, pointing to a libidinal economy that operates within that sign system.

            This set of engagements became a way of the Birmingham school to critically engage in the changing practices of the working classes of the 60’s, 70’s, and 80’s.  They could begin to produce a critical analysis of how youth practices indicated a shift in the class composition of the English working class after the Second World War, arguing against a conventional Marxist narrative that insisted on a static image of the working class and at the same time, against a popular notion that youth culture provided a transcendence from the old class divisions that defined the society before the war.  Instead, the negotiation of class began to take shape within the increased consumption that increased wages had provided the working classes, and through a set of relations produced within the logic of the commodity and the pleasure of consumption and style.[26]

            Within that context, Gramsci’s concept of the war of position allows for an analysis of how working class resistance occurs within the hegemonic structures of the welfare state, focusing on tactical engagements, social formations that are not necessarily immediately political, etc.  It marks a shift in the engagement of a whole series of social forms that formerly acted as dominant forms of counter-systemic politics, such as trade unions and communist and social democratic political parties.[27] It tries to map the politics that are increased marked by a disengagement with those traditional forms of politics, a moment that would eventually shift into a time and place where, “one is a socialist because one used to be one, no longer going to demonstrations, attending meetings”, etc.[28]  We can find a radical political formation, pluralist and contradictory, resisting the forms of social reproduction and sketching out possible alternatives between that moment of depoliticization and the quiet of the immediate post war.

            Cultural Studies offered a set of critical tools that allowed for an examination of the transformations of the class struggle, marking out the terrain of the system, its continuation and intensification of forms of exploitation, alienation, and domination.  It also marked the forms of collectivity and resistance that could be found within that system.  As those forms developed, it tried to contribute to their growth.  In short, it becomes a project very similar to the radical and feminist groups discussed earlier in the essay, and similar to them, the project became one that offered those tools in service of those movements, although never fully as either a vanguard or as a set of organic intellectual.  One could say that the engagement of these scholars is as much of a social experiment in reimagining the relationship between intellectuals and social movements, as the movements were experiments in creating alternative modes of social reproduction.

            Now that we recognize the role a critical set of tools put under the rubric of theory, we can now return to some of the questions posed by the prompt.  First, theory can never be understood as a method of ‘liberating’ everyday life.  Instead, theory offers a set of critical analytical tools that allow for an analysis of everyday life, allowing for critical engagement with both the social structures of a particular moment in the development of capitalism, along with the forms of resistance immanent to it.  The construction of new forms of life that would ‘daily life’ must be produced by sustained forms of collective action that may be informed by theory, but cannot be supplanted by theory.  To enter into what the new forms of those actions might be put us outside the framework of this essay, and to be frank, I am not sure what those forms might possibly be.

            Within this context, the limitations of the American approach the genre can be linked to a pair of problems, which while related, are distinct as well.  The first problem is that the U.S. engagement with cultural studies (at least the dominant moment) occurred precisely at the moment that the critical practices of the new left were either being destroyed or neutralized by being reincorporated in the service of capital.  This fact does not immediately negate the value of investigating these cultural formations, but the methods of inquiry did not recognize the ‘re-colonization’ of those formerly ambivalently liberated practices and institutions. To put it in Deleuzian terms, it posed an endless series of lines of flight, precisely at the moment when those lines of flight were being captured.
  
          The second problem could be lined to the concept of agency, a concept that is only prominent within the U.S. context.   It can be found in the structure of part of the question itself, when it poses the question, “Does Consumer Culture, for example, necessarily preclude agency?”  The most immediate answer to that question if we take the engagement of the work of most of the authors seriously would be no.  But the notion of agency retains a linkage with a liberal humanist project, doesn’t fully engage with the forms of collectivity that define the attempt to resignify a series of commodities, whether through formations of subculture, race, class or gender.  These can only be understood through an set of concepts that explore structures of inter-subjectivity, rather than looking for an agent, whether individual or collective.

            However, these two problems don’t inherently explain the difficulties of theorizing daily life, although they point to some inherent difficulties, viz. the continual transformation capitalism through the incorporation of its own crises and contradictions.  This practice of incorporation refuses the ability to find any form of stable resistance, given the ability for those modes of resistance to be incorporated.  Althusser offers a critical approach to thinking through this process with his distinction between science and ideology.  Ideologies are marked by their critical engagement with particular, and historic forms of capitalism, with its structures of domination, and its forms of resistance.  Science on the other hand is the attempt to produce a method of critically engaging with the new structures of power, resistance, etc. as they make the old ideological structure obsolete.  This engagement, as we have seen, is neither a simple or easy process.


[1] For more on this please look at Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review, 2001)
[2] On this topic, see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985), amongst others

[3] See Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community (London: Falling Wall Press, 1975)
[4] Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 122.
[5] Ibid., 114.
[6] Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy” of Sex” in Women, Class, and the Feminist Imagination, Ed. Karen V. Hansen and Ilene J. Philipson (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).  Also look at the readings by Jacques Lacan on the concept as well as the various feminist takes on his work.
[7] It goes without saying that this project never becomes fully successful, although it’s worth noting that the erasure of the contingency of this project was more successful.
[8] C L R James, Raya Dunayevskaya, and Paul Buhle, State Capitalism and World Revolution (New York: Charles H. Kerr, 1986) is probably the most definitive statement of the group, although there are a lot of essays by James floating around that also cover the topic.
[9] The best examples of the intellectual engagement of the group can be found in Cornelius Castriadis’ Political and Social Writings, which cover the period from 1956 through the 1960’s
[10]Steven Wright, Storming Heaven (London: Pluto Press, 2002)  Although minimizing some of the debates around feminism, Wright offers a good history of the activist and intellectual practices that lead up to the formation of the various Autonomy groups, moving from the 1950’s to the 1970’s.
[11] Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, trans. John Cumming, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum, 1999)
[12] Ibid., 126.
[13] Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. 1 (London: Verso, 2008), 177.
[14] For more on this, please look at Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)
[15] Raymond Williams, The City and the Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973)
[16] Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (London: Transaction Publishers), 9-10.
[17] Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. 1, trans. John Moore (London: Verso, 1991), 140.
[18] Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 265.
[19] Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
[20] Culture, Media, Language, Ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis (London: Hutchinton University Library, 1987)
[21] See Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci” and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985) for this history.   Also, Stuart Hall, “Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity”
[22] Antonio Gramsci, Gramsci, Antonio and Joseph Buttigieg. Prison Notebooks. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, 61.

[23] Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffery Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 323.
[24] Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and the Centre: some problematic and problems” in Culture, Media, Language, Ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis (London: Hutchinson University Library. 1987)
[25] V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), 23.
[26] Resistance through Rituals, Ed. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (London: Routledge, 1993)  and Dick Hedige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Routledge, 1979)
[27] Read Immanuel Wallerstein, “1968, Revolution in the World System: Theses and Queries”  Wallerstein argues that the revolt of 1968 was both against U.S. hegemony, as well as against a set of older counter-systemic movements that succeeded in taking state power, without producing the transformation in social relations that were promised by these movements.
[28] Michel de Certeau,  The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 177.